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CONTEMPORARY CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
SELECTED EARLY AND MODERN VIEWPOINTS
In the early 1960's the American Negro's struggle for civil rights
underwent a fundamental transformation. The long-used procedure of
seeking progress through judicial decision and legislative action, while
not abandoned, was overshadowed by the more direct and dramatic
method of challenging discrimination through calculated acts of civil
disobedience.' This use of civil disobedience raises once again the per-
ennial jurisprudential issue of a citizen's duty to obey enacted law, and
perhaps the issue has not been so clearly raised since the post-War re-
flection on Hitler's reign of terror.2
This note will first discuss the characteristics of this contemporary
civil disobedience; secondly, relate it to the ideas of three earlier philoso-
phers who represent three schools of natural law; thirdly, consider it in
relation to four recent writings on civil disobedience; and finally, point
out two central issues which recur in the writings of the seven men. The
three earlier writers have been selected because each is an important rep-
resentative of his school who gives extensive consideration to the ques-
tion of obedience to law, while the four contemporary writers were chosen
because their attitudes toward civil disobedience range from disapproval
to acclaim.
Outside the scope of this note is the issue, raised in the famous Hart-
Fuller debate,3 of whether "legal positivism" at least by implication fa-
vors submission to all enacted law, no matter how unjust. This issue is
not discussed because much of the disagreement centers on whether such
a position is implied in the positivist's avowal to study the law "as it is"
or as a "fact,"4 and less time is devoted to the merits of such position
1. HILL, RHETORIC OF RACIAL REVOLT 286-91 (1964) ; KnI,, WHY WE CAN'T WAIT
1-14 (1963); WESTIN, FE EDoir Now! V (1964).
2. For discussion of the duty of obedience under the Third Reich, see, e.g., Fuller,
American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL ED. 457, 581-85 (1954);
Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law.--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 615-21 (1958). For recent articles on contemporary civil disobedience see, e.g.,
Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of Law, 14 BUFFALO L. REV. 199 (1964); Leonard,
Morality in Race Relations, 11 CATHOLIC LAW 202, 206-7 (1965) ; MacGuigan, Civil Dis-
obediece and Natural Law, 11 CATHOLIC LAW. 118 (1965); Tweed, Segal & Parker,
Civil Rights and Disobedience to Law: A Lawyer's View, 36 N.Y.S.BJ. 290 (1964);
Comment, The Sit-In: An Analysis of Competing Interests, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 714
(1964).
3. Hart, supra note 2; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Profes-
sor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
4. See Ross, ON LAW AND JUsTICE 31-32 (1959) ; Fuller, supra note 3, at 631-33,
657-61, 669-72; Hart, supra note 2, at 596-98, 606, 615-21.
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from a moral or legal standpoint. Rather than digressing to attempt-
against their protests-to "read into" the positivists' position a particular
stand on the question of disobedience, this note is limited to writers who
openly discuss disobedience as a legal and moral question.
Characteristics of Contemporary Civil Disobedience.
It is erroneous to look upon the Civil Rights Movement as a mono-
lithic, well-disciplined organization, for the Movement ranges from the
radical separationism of the Black Muslims, through the activist, but es-
sentially conciliatory Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Mar-
tin Luther King, Jr., to the more conservative and legally oriented Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People.' Therefore,
any generalizations valid for all civil rights groups must of necessity be
limited to such banalities as "interest in improving the Negro's status" or
"opposition to the present social and economic structure." In order to
avoid the problem created by this lack of coherence, this note will con-
centrate on the "middle group" of civil rights organizations-the South-
ern Christian Leadership Conference, Students' Non-violent Coordinat-
ing Committee, and the Congress on Racial Equality. This group of
organizations best fits the purposes of this note, because these organi-
zations have been primarily responsible for the promotion of civil dis-
obedience as a tool in the civil rights struggle, whereas the Muslims seek
to become "in but not of the society,"' while the NAACP has concen-
trated on legalism Further, the statements of Martin Luther King, Jr.,
will be used to show the ideological and philosophical basis of this civil
disobedience, for King is probably the best known leader of the "middle
group," and an articulate defender of civil disobedience as a legitimate
instrument of the Civil Rights Movement.'
Perhaps the most striking characteristic of the Negro Revolution is
that it does not seek to overthrow the present legal and political system;
its avowed objective is not the destruction of American society, but
rather, full participation in it. Unlike the French Revolutionaries who
sought to crush the ancien r4gime, the civil rights leaders desire to fulfill
the American Way of Life by allowing Negroes to become full partici-
5. For such characterization of the civil rights organizations, see LOMAX, THE
NEGRO REVOLT 127-29, 147-63, 177 (1962).
6. For use of the term "'in' but not 'of' the society," and for discussions of the phe-
nomenon of -a minority which is physically, but not spiritually, within a society, see 1
TOYNBEE, A STUDY oF HISToRY 41 n.3 (1962).
7. This categorizing of the organizations of course is not absolute, for the NAACP
does assist the demonstrators, and both the "middle group" and the Black Muslims do
not hesitate to avail themselves of the courts.
8. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, 165-7 (1965). LOMAX, op. Cit.
supra note 5, at 84-100.
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pants in it.' Their aim is to eradicate patterns of discrimination which
they believe prevent this full participation, and while one may argue that
the methods employed, or even the eradication itself, will radically alter
this Way of Life, the fact remains that the expressed goal is fulfillment,
not destruction, of American ideals.
Another characteristic of contemporary civil disobedience is per-
haps a result of the moderate nature of its goal, that is, the disobedience
has received the sympathy, if not approval, of many high governmental
officials."0 Likewise Congress and the federal courts have frequently re-
acted to the disobedience by legislating against the complained-of condi-
tion," or nullifying the disobeyed law,12 rather than acting to suppress
the disobedience.
An important consideration in any jurisprudential examination of
civil disobedience is whether or not any legal means exists to change the
disapproved law or condition. The answer to this question also happens
to be a central point of disagreement between the advocates and oppon-
ents of contemporary civil disobedience. 3 Much of the disagreement
seems to be over what constitutes satisfactory legal means of redress.
Most civil rights leaders would hardly dispute that at least theoretically
legal means to correct the conditions do exist-indec d they constantly as-
sert that government has the power to make the corrections, and force-
fully urge that it employ such power. 4 However, while conceding the
theoretical possibility of success through strictly legal means, they main-
tain that in practice legal solutions, without the catalyst of civil dis-
obedience, will either come too slowly, or perhaps not at all.'"
Finally, there is an important dichotomy apparent in the acts of civil
disobedience-disobedience of laws considered unjust in themselves, e.g.,
laws calling for segregated eating facilities, and disobedience of laws not
considered unjust in themselves, e.g., laws forbidding obstruction of
9. See, e.g., KING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 137-69.
10. See, e.g., John F. Kennedy, speech to the nation, June 11, 1963 (WrrTE, op. Cit.
supra note 8, at 172-3).
11. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000(a)
(1964) (banning discrimination in public accommodations).
12. See, e.g., Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Gober v. Birmingham,
373 U.S. 374 (1963) ; Avent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963) (all reversed sit-in
demonstrators' trespass convictions).
13. See, e.g., LOMAX, op. cit. supra note 5, at 124-5; RA-,, AMERIcAN RACE RELA-
TION S TODAY 23-27 (1962); WHITE, op. cit. supra note 8 at 165-66; King, The Civil
Right Struggle in the United States Today, 20 RECORD SuPPL. 5 (1965) ; Waldman, Civil
Rights-Yes; Civil Disobedience-No (A Reply to Dr. Martin Luther King), 37 N.Y.S.
BJ. 331-2 (1965).
14. See, e.g., RAAB, op. cit. supra note 13; WirrE, op. cit. supra note 13, at 161-89.
15. See, e.g., LOMAX, op. cit. supra note 5, at 124-5; KiNv, op. cit. supra note 1, at
479
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traffic." Likewise the aims of the two situations are different; in the
former it is to eradicate the law itself,"7 and in the latter, to use defiance
of the law as a means of drawing attention to grievances not directly con-
nected with the law. 8 The two types of disobedience at times raise dif-
ferent issues, and when necessary, they will be treated separately.
King at least tacitly recognizes this dichotomy when justifying civil
disobedience, for generally his defense of civil disobedience assumes that
defiance is of unjust laws. Perhaps his best known statement on civil
disobedience is contained in his "Letter from a Birmingham jail," writ-
ten in April, 1963:
. there are two types of laws: just and unjust. I
would be the first to advocate obeying just laws. One has not
only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. Con-
versely, one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws.
I would agree with St. Augustine that 'an unjust law is no law
at all.'
A just law is a man-made code that squares with the
moral law or the law of God. An unjust law is a code that is
out of harmony with the moral law. To put it in the terms of
St. Thomas Aquinas: 'An unjust law is a human law that is
not rooted in eternal law and natural law. .. .'
• . . An unjust law is a code that a numerical or power
majority group compels a minority group to obey but does not
make binding on tiself . . . a just law is a code that a majority
compels a minority to follow and that it is willing to follow
itself ...
A law is unjust if it is inflicted on a minority that,
as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in
enacting or devising the law ...
. . . In no sense do I advocate evading or defying the law,
as would the rabid segregationist. That would lead to anarchy.
One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and
with a willingness to accept the penalty. [An individual who
does this] to arouse the conscience of the community over its
injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law."9
16. Civil rights leaders consider laws unjust if either "unjust on their face," such
as segregation laws, or "unjust in their administration," e.g., parade restrictions which
are in practice applied only to Negro groups. For purposes of this note, a law "unjust
in itself" covers both situations.
17. See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
18. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
19. KING, op. cit. supra note 1, at 84-86.
48.0
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Thus in 1963, King limited his justification of civil disobedience to
unjust laws; however, in 1965 he was willing to e.:tend this defense to
include defiance under certain circumstances of laws not unjust in them-
selves. In a question and answer period following an address before the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Aipril 21, 1965, King
was asked: "Does your concept of civil disobedience include such tactics
as obstructing sites where Negroes are not employed, where those who
use such means . . . are not quarreling with the justice of any law?"
King answered:
[A] I1 civil disobedience must be centered on something.
. . . the goals must be clearly stated. . . . [T]here are in-
stances wherein the process of frustration with the structure of
things, people find themselves in positions of not quite being
able to see the unjust law. But they see injustice in a very
large sense existing. Consequently, they feel the need to en-
gage in civil disobedience to call attention to overall injustice.
At that point they are not protesting against an unjust law.
[Where communities do not work to remove injustice] men of
conscience and men of good will have no alternative but to en-
gage in some kind of civil disobedience in order to call atten-
tion to the injustices, so that the society will seek to rid itself
of that overall injustice. Again . . . there must be a willing-
ness to accept the penalty.
20
Three Earlier Writers and Contemporary Civil Disobedience.
The three philosophers discussed here represent the three general
schools of earlier natural law philosophy-ancient, medieval and classi-
cal."' Each is an important and not atypical reprcsentative of his par-
ticular school of philosophy, and each addresses himself to the question
of a citizen's duty of obedience to law.
Ancient. Law is the "central, unifying subject of Plato's philoso-
phy,"22 and in Crito he has Socrates speak at length on the citizen's duty
to obey the laws.2" Plato's position seems to be that a citizen has an al-
most absolute duty to submit to law, even when he believes a law to be
unjust. Socrates says:
20. See KING, op. cit. mpra note 13, at 24.
21. For this classification of natural law, see BoDE-NHrJMER, JTJ1SPRUDENcE 3-59
(1962).
22. HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRimiNAL THORY 48 (1958).




Shall I reply, "But the state has injured me: it has decided my
case wrongly ?" . . . And suppose the laws were to reply, "Was
that our agreement? Or was it that you would submit to what-
ever judgments the state should pronounce? . . . [Y] ou must
do whatever your city and your country bid you to do, or you
must convince them that their commands are unjust.24
While this statement appears unequivocal, it should be kept in mind
that Plato is referring to law in the ancient Greek sense of a body of
rules which have a long tradition of honored usage, and which are in
harmony with the law of Nature.25 Whether Plato would maintain this
attitude of obedience when confronted with an utterly arbitrary rule of
a tyrant is left unanswered. However, that answer being what it may,
given the condition of a reasonably honorific legal system, Plato would
"submit to whatever judgments the state should pronounce."2  There-
fore at this point the conclusion seems unavoidable that Plato would dis-
approve of contemporary civil disobedience, since it does not condemn the
entire legal system, but chooses to disobey only certain laws considered
unjust. Obviously the same would hold true for disobedience of laws
not considered unjust in themselves.
However, this judgment might be tempered by two statements that
Plato has Socrates make. Socrates quotes the laws as saying "if any
man of the Athenians is dissatisfied with us, he may take his goods and
go away whithersoever he pleases; we give that permission to every
man." 7 If Plato is offering this as a reasonable alternative to obedience,
then it could be said that since the Negro cannot simply pack up and
"leave Athens," the two situations are not analogous. However, the
laws continue "But we say that every man of you who remains here . . .
has agreed . . . to do whatsoever we bid him."28 It is an all or nothing
situation-once you accept the laws, you must obey them all, not merely
those that please you. The advocates of civil disobedience do not wish
to "leave Athens," i.e., reject the general legal system, and thus Plato
would have the laws tell them: "If you had desired to reject us entirely,
and were unable to do so, obedience might be a different matter, but since
you do not desire to reject most of us, you must accept all of us."
A second possible qualification comes when the laws tell Socrates
"we gave him his choice, either to obey us, or to convince us that we were
24. Id. XI-XII.
25. HALL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 48-50.




wrong."" Thus, assuming King is correct in stating that they disobey
only laws which "a minority . . . as a result of being denied the right
to vote, had no part in enacting or devising,"3 thea one might contend
that the Negro has been denied the alternative of convincing the law that
it is wrong. However, it is doubtful that Plato is maintaining that this
opportunity to convince the laws of their error is a requisite to their va-
lidity, once the legal system is accepted. As quoted previously, the laws
say "you must do whatever your city and your country bid you to do, or
you must convince them that their commands are unjust." Since in either
alternative the final decision remains in the state, "or you must convince
them" seems to mean "unless you convince them," and thus persuasion is
not always an available alternative to obedience. The non-essential nature
of this alternative is further seen when Socrates in The Apology scolds
the judges for their unwillingness to listen to reasoned argument on his
behalf. " Plato has Socrates accept his own condenanation without hav-
ing had much opportunity to convince his triers of their error, and thus
it is doubtful that he considered this opportunity to be a condition neces-
sary for obedience.
Medieval. Martin Luther King, Jr., cites Thomas Aquinas as sup-
porting his position,32 and indeed the thirteenth century giant of Scholas-
tic Philosophy does consider at length both law, and man's obligation to
obey law. In Questions 90 through 97 of SUAMMA THEOLOGICA he dis-
cusses the nature of law, and defines law as "an ordinance of reason for
the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
promulgated."3 3 After giving this general definition of law, Aquinas
distinguishes four kinds of law and explains their interrelationship. Eter-
nal law is a type of Divine Wisdom, or Exemplar in God, which directs
all things to their end; 4 natural law is man's perception of, and partici-
pation in, the eternal law by use of his reason,"5 and human law (positive
law) is the body of "particular determinations" devised by human reason
from the precepts of natural law.3" Finally, there is Divine law, or Holy
Scripture, which consists of certain commandments given to man by God
directly, so that such commandments will not be subject to imperfections
in man's perception of the eternal law."
29. Ibid.
30. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
31. XXIX.
32. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
33. Quest. 90, art. 4.
34. Quest. 93, art. 1.
35. Quest. 91, art. 2.
36. Quest. 91, art. 3.
37. Quest. 91, art. 4.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Thus, as King suggests, Aquinas maintains that human law must be
in accord with natural law (and therefore eternal law) or else "it is no
longer a law but a perversion of law.""8  Further, Aquinas quotes St.
Augustine, as does King, as saying "that which is not just seems to be
no law at all."89 Aquinas states that a law may be unjust in two ways:
first, by being contrary to natural law, and second, by being opposed to
Divine law, i.e., Scripture."0
Concerning man's right to disobey unjust law, he establishes two
standards, one for each type of unjust law. In the case of a human law
which violates Divine law, Aquinas' position is unequivocal-"laws of
this kind must nowise be observed" 4-a subject has not only a right, but
also a duty to disobey such commands. Thus, if contemporary civil dis-
obedience is directed toward laws which violate Divine law, that is, Scrip-
ture, then indeed Aquinas would agree it is justified and even obligatory.
However, apparently he meant for this absolute invalidity to apply to only
a narrowly defined group of laws which are in direct conflict with Scrip-
ture, as evidenced by the example he gives-"laws of tyrants inducing to
idolatry."4 2 This type of unjust law is contrasted with the other kind of
unjust law which more generally violates natural law because it is not
"ordained to the common good."4
Therefore, contemporary civil disobedience seems aimed at laws
which, assuming their unjustness, Aquinas would place under the latter
broader category of unjust laws, that is, laws which, while not ordained
to the common good, are not directly in violation of Scripture. King de-
fines an unjust law as "a code that a numerical or power majority group
compels a minority group to obey but does not make binding on itself,")44
and such definition seems to agree with Aquinas' definition of laws that
violate natural law. He says that laws are just when "burdens are laid
on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and with a view to
the common good," and unjust "when burdens are imposed unequally on
the community,"'" and further he states that "whatever law a man makes
for another, he should keep himself."4 Admittedly, one should be aware
that Aquinas is discussing general precepts, and he himself recognizes
that conclusions to be drawn from such precepts must take into account
38. Quest. 95, art. 2.
39. Ibid.




44. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
45. Quest. 96, art. 4.
46. Quest. 96, art. 5.
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all contingencies, and thus such conclusions are not immediately percept-
able and certain. 7 However, the central theme of this note is the nature
of a citizen's duty to obey enacted law when faced with injustice, and
therefore for the sake of discussion it will be assumed that the defied
laws do fall within Aquinas' definition of a law that is unjust because it
is not ordained to the common good.
Turning to man's duty of obedience in relation to this kind of un-
just law, he says "such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in
order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even
yield his right" and "neither in such matters is man bound to obey the
law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous
hurt."4  Therefore man has no obligation to obey such law, unless the
ensuing disorder is more harmful to the common good than is the unjust
law itself. There are two reasons why contemporary civil disobedience
may conform to this standard.
First, the Movement, as visualized by King, aims at open defiance of
certain unjust laws without violence, while professing respect for all other
law, and thus "arouse the conscience of the community over [their] in-
justice."4 In contrast to a general assault on the whole legal system, this
approach seems calculated to keep disorder within narrow limits, and at a
minimum. However, by the same standard, that is, an effort to keep
disorder at a minimum, disobedience of laws not considered unjust, for
the express purpose of creating disorder to draw attention to non-legal
injustice, would tend not to conform to this standard.
Secondly, the fact that the disobedience has elicited a generally posi-
tive response from the courts and Congress, seems to indicate that rather
than create undue "scandal or disturbance," the disobedience has attacked
the unjust law without rending apart the social fabric. However, if in
fact this program of disobedience is generating an attitude of general dis-
respect for law, as is contended by some observers, ' then it would seem
subject to Aquinas' injunction to yield the right.
Furthermore, in considering contemporary civil disobedience in light
of Aquinas' standard for permissible disobedience, a key question is the
existence of satisfactory legal means to change disfavored laws. As men-
tioned previously, this question is a central point cf dispute in the civil
rights debate. If this legal means of redress does exist, then disobedi-
ence would be much more difficult to justify under the Aquinas position.
47. Quest. 94, art. 4.
48. Quest. 96, art. 4.
49. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
50. See, e.g., Powell, Respect for Law and Due Process-The Foundation of a
Free Society, 18 U. FLA. L. REv. 1 (1965).
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Aquinas is saying that human law should promote both justice and order
which together work for the common good. Admittedly Aquinas is not
completely clear as to which of these two values is primary in case of ir-
reconcilable conflict; for on one hand, he suggests that it is order when
he states "to avoid scandal or disturbance . . . a man should even yield
his right."'" On the other hand, he intimates that the true test is one of
"balancing the interests" to promote the greatest common good, for he
says one should not obey unjust law "provided he avoid giving scandal
or inflicting a more grievous hurt."52 In any case, whatever is the actual
priority between justice and order, undoubtedly order is a value to be pre-
served even at considerable cost, and thus if legal means of redress are
available, both justice and order can be accommodated, and disobedience
is not to be approved.
Classical. Bodenheimer gives the name "classical natural law" to
the legal philosophy which arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies along with the post-Reformation transformation of the European
social and political structure. This classical natural law is distinguished
from medieval natural law by its divorce of law from theology, elabora-
tion of concrete details from general principles, emphasis on the "natural
rights" of man, and its shift from a "teleological to a causal and empiri-
cal view of the nature of man.""
John Locke is perhaps the best known classical advocate of the doc-
trine of the inalienable natural rights of man, and his writings greatly
influenced the thinking of the founders of the American Republic. 4
Locke states that "all men are naturally in . . . a state of perfect free-
dom to order their actions . . . as they see fit, within the bounds of the
law of nature, without asking or depending on the will of any other
man."55  However, because of the difficulty, danger and inconvenience
involved in having every man his own judge and enforcer of his natural
rights, men by their mutual consent join together into a political society,
or commonwealth.5" Thus, "[T] hose who are united into one body and
have a common established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority
to decide controversies between them . . . are in civil society. . . ."
Every man gives his "consent," at least tacitly, to become a part of the
commonwealth, and to be bound by its laws, when he holds and enjoys
51. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
52. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
53. BODENHEimE, op. cit. mtpra note 21, at 32-3.
54. See, e.g., MASON, FREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING 3 (1956).
55. LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Hafner Library of Classics ed.,
1947), Second Treatise, ch. II, § 4.
56. Id. ch. VII, § 87.
57. Ibid.
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possessions under its dominion."8
However, in joining in this social contract, men do not submit them-
selves to the arbitrary and unlimited power of the commonwealth, be-
cause in nature each man did not have such power over himself, but only
the power to preserve and protect his life and his property;59 not having
such arbitrary power over himself, he could not transfer it to the com-
monwealth.60 Therefore the government which is formed by the com-
monwealth has only the right to act for the public good, and cannot de-
prive any man of his property, or subject him to its arbitrary will.8"
Moreover, Locke makes it emphatically clear that when a govern-
ment transgresses these limits, the people have a right to resist and over-
throw this government." On this general proposition, that the people
have a right to resist an oppressive government, Locke's position is as
unequivocal as it is well-known. However, difficult complications ap-
pear when this doctrine, as elaborated by Locke, is considered in relation
to contemporary civil disobedience.
The basic difficulty centers around the question of the right of an
aggrieved minority, not majority, to resist the unjust acts of the govern-
ment. As Martin Luther King, Jr., points out, the civil rights move-
ment seeks to disobey laws imposed unjustly by a majority upon a mi-
nority. In considering this question of minority rights, it is important
to recognize that Locke postulates two agreements. The first is that
which "brings men out of the loose state of nature into one politic so-
ciety [and] which everyone has with the rest to incorporate and act as one
body, and so be one distinct commonwealth,"6 and the first and funda-
mental act of this commonwealth is the establishment of a legislature in
which resides the supreme power of the commonwealth. "4 The second
agreement occurs when the people, as a commonwealth, delegate this
legislative power to one or many, and in doing so, form a government. 5
58. Id. ch. VIII, §§ 119-20.
59. "Property," as defined by Locke, includes "lives, liberties, and estates" See
Id. ch. IX, § 123.
60. Id. ch. IX, § 130; ch. XI, § 135.
61. Id. ch. XI, §§ 137-38.
62. Id. ch. XIII, § 149; § 155; ch. XVIII, §§ 203-09; ch. XIX, § 222; f 231-32.
63. Id. ch. XIX, § 211; see also ch. IX, § 131.
64. Id. ch. XI, § 134.
65. Id. ch. X, § 132. Admittedly, Locke is somewhat ambiguous on this point at
times, for he speaks of the majority making laws for the community, in which case "the
form of government is a perfect democracy," as contrasted with placing this power in
the hands of delegates. Ibid. In the former situation there would seem to be no differ-
ence between the original commonwealth and the government. However, there is no
doubt that he does make a distinction between the society and the government, as evi-
denced by his statement that one should "distinguish between ihe dissolution of the so-
ciety and the dissolution of the government." Id. ch. XIX, § 211. A further distinction
to be kept in mind is that within the government itself there i%,ill be an executive which
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When Locke speaks of the right of the people to resist arbitrary legisla-
tive power (or executive power which, in turn, is derived from and de-
pendent on the legislative power)," he is referring to the exercise of such
power under this secondary arrangement, that is, by the "government,"
not the "society" or "commonwealth." He talks of the right of the peo-
ple to remove the legislative power from those who abuse it, and to re-
entrust it to others ;7 further, he states that almost the only way society
can be dissolved is by foreign conquest, whereas government can be dis-
solved when the people remove the legislative power from it, or where
the prince, i.e., executive, hinders the legislature.68 The upshot of this is
that the acts of the people as a body, or society, are absolutely binding on
all within the society. In fact Locke makes it clear that once such society
is formed, "the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole," and
that everyone in the society is under an obligation "to submit to the de-
termination of the majority and to be concluded by it."69  A further in-
dication that Locke considered the majority as the final arbiter of rights
is his answer to the question: "Who shall be the judge whether the prince
or legislative act contrary to their trust?" He replies: "The people shall
be the judge. '7
However, while Locke says that the will of the majority is conclu-
sive on all, he also states, as mentioned previously, that a man "cannot
submit himself to the arbitrary power of another," and can give up only
so much power as "the law of nature gave him for the preservation of
himself," and that "this is all he can or does give up to the common-
wealth."'" This indicates that Locke recognizes a limitation to the power
of the commonwealth (society) as well as to that of the government. The
question he does not address himself to is the one which is central to our
problem-the right of a minority to resist when the majority actively
supports laws which deprvie this minority of its "inalienable rights." A
basic assumption of The Second Treatise is that the people, if allowed to
express their will by majority action, will not single out and mistreat any
is subordinate to, and derives its power from, the legislative. Id. ch. XIII, §§ 150-53.
Apparently the legislative power, although the "supreme power" is still subject to a
"more" supreme power in the people to remove or alter it! Id. ch. XIII, § 149.
66. See note 65 supra.
67. LoCKE, op. cit. supra note 55, at ch. XIII, § 149.
68. Id. ch. XIX, 33 211-12.
69. Id. ch. VIII, §§ 96-97. Locke does suggest that a minority, or even a single in-
dividual, has the right (although perhaps not the physical power) to resist the unlawful
acts of the executive; however, it is clear that he is speaking of the executive as dis-
tinguished from the "legislative," and even more from "the people," because he says
such suppression of a minority may be tolerated by the bulk of the people until the il-
legal acts affect a majority or at least arouse its indignation. See Id. ch. XVIII, § 208.
70. Id. ch. XIX, § 240.
71. Id. ch. XI, § 135.
CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
minority. Of course it is just such mistreatment of a minority by the
majority that is the avowed target of the civil rights movement.
While Locke does not address himself to this essential question, an-
other position of his is at least indirectly relevant to contemporary civil
disobedience. He makes it clear that every individual, and the people as
a whole, owe absolute obedience to the legislative power, i.e., the govern-
ment, until the people should choose to replace it, and thus "the legislative
can never revert to the people while that government lasts." 2 Therefore,
while he does not consider the possibility of an aggrieved minority re-
jecting the rule of the majority, Locke does suggest that no one, includ-
ing the majority, can selectively disobey certain laws enacted by the legis-
lature-until he decides to reject its authority entirely, he is bound to
obey all of its acts.7 ' Thus, even assuming that the minority has the
same right to resist the laws of the majority that the latter has to resist
the laws of the government, by the same standard, the minority is pre-
cluded from disobeying certain laws until it is willing to reject the whole
legal system. This selective disobedience, while maintaining allegiance
to the general legal system, is of course exactly wlat is favored by the
advocates of the present civil disobedience.
If legal means to redress wrongs and remove unjust laws exist-a
proposition which is disputed by the proponents of civil disobedience-
another implication of Locke's theory of the social contract is relevant.
As noted, a primary purpose of men uniting into a society is to have an
authority to settle disputes and thus eliminate the need for each man to
resort to self-help in vindicating his rights. Of course Locke is here
speaking of settling disputes between two men, and not of conflicts be-
tween men and laws of the government. However, the relevant point for
this discussion is that this implies that a fundamental value of society,
and of men generally, is the orderly and peaceable settlement of conflicts.
This suggests that even if a right to disobey ordinarily exists, if the
grievance can be redressed without disobedience and disorder, then such
disobedience should be foregone.
Commeni t on the Earlier Writers.
In considering contemporary civil disobedience in relation to the
standards set down by these earlier writers, there is an important point
which should not be overlooked. This is of course the fact that they are
not viewing the problem of disobedience in the conte:t of a modern demo-
72. Id. ch. XIX, § 243; see also ch. XIII, § 149.
73. Locke is speaking here of the legislative power, because the people do have the
power to disobey the executive whenever it conflicts with the legislative power. See
note 69 mtpra.
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cratic society. If, in a democratic society, the right of all normal adults
to participate, at least indirectly, in the law-making process, is considered
a requisite to the validity of the laws, then a member of a minority group
arbitrarily excluded from the law-making process may not be under the
same duty of obedience as is a full participant in the process. On the
other hand, if, as in the societies of these earlier writers, participation by
all adults is not considered a requisite to the laws' validity, then the in-
ability to participate in the law-making process will not affect the duty
of obedience. In other words, a minority group faced with systematic
exclusion from the law-making process, in a society which has as a fun-
damental presumption the right of participation, may not be in the same
moral position in relation to obedience as is a comparable group in a so-
ciety with no such presumption. Unfortunately for our purposes, these
earlier writers were dealing with societies in which no such presumption
existed.
In fact, this same condition of differing historical contexts may be
one reason it is difficult to find a common theme running through the
writings of the three men. Plato lived in a Greek city-state, and he em-
phasizes that one has an almost absolute duty to obey the laws based on
an honorable bargain made with the city-state. Aquinas gives a citizen the
right to disobey "unjust" laws-subject to the condition of not creating
undue disorder-but perhaps accompanying this concession is the un-
articulated assumption that most laws will be "ordained to the common
good" in Aquinas' relatively static medieval society under the aegis of
the Church, and thus unjust laws which may be disobeyed are not apt to
be often encountered. Likewise Locke's opposition to the divine right
of kings should be noted when considering his position which gives the
majority nearly unlimited right to oust the government, while paying
little attention to the possibility of a minority being persecuted by the
majority.
This is not to suggest that philosophical and ethical principles have
no relevance beyond the chronological position of their authors, but to
keep in mind that in applying such principles, the historical context of
their formulation is a factor to consider.
Recent Writings on Civil Disobedience
and Contemporary Civil Disobedience.
As this note has already indicated, a great deal has been written on
contemporary civil disobedience as an aspect of the larger question of a
citizen's duty to obey enacted law. 4 Here recent writings by four con-
74. See note 2 supra.
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temporary legal philosophers and jurists will be discussed for the purpose
of examining current civil rights civil disobedience in light of the atti-
tude of each toward civil disobedience as a general legal and philosophical
proposition. The four writers here considered have been selected be-
cause their respective attitudes toward civil disobedience in a democratic
society range from strong disapproval to strong approval under certain
circumstances. It is important to note that all four address themselves
to disobedience in a democratic society, and not in a totalitarian regime,
and that fact in itself raises a significant question in relation to con-
temporary civil disobedience, a question which will be touched upon in
the course of the discussion. It should also be noted that while two of
the writers indicate that they view favorably contemporary civil dis-
obedience, one disapproves and one takes no position, this note will
not merely accept their conclusions on this point, but will consider the
logical implications of their propositions as these implications relate to
contemporary disobedience.
Louis Waldnwn, a prominent member of the New York bar and a
leader of the legal profession, takes a finn stand agains civil disobedience
in a reply" ' to Martin Luther King's earlier speech be fore the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York.76 Waldman's central position is
that King's philosophy--that a citizen has a right to disobey a law he
considers unjust-by logical implication means that every group should
do this, and the result would be the breakdown of the legal system. He
says "civil disobedience cannot end with Negroes alone. You cannot
build a fence around this kind of program." 77 He strongly emphasizes
that the United States has a "democratic constitutional system" and that
"laws enacted pursuant to our Constitution must bc? obeyed whether the
individuals or groups affected by those laws believe they are just or
not. 
s7
However, Waldman does not devote enough attention to at least
four points, discussion of which seems essential to the defense of his po-
sition. The first is an important qualification which King places on the
right to disobey a law viewed as unjust, that is, the willingness to accept
punishment for the violation. 9 If the civil disobedient adheres to this
restriction, then it seems likely that the use of disobedience as an easy
way to get what one wants would be greatly reduced, and would result
in a personal sacrifice on the part of the protestor-a sacrifice likely to
75. See note 13 supra.
76. See note 13 supra.
77. See, Waldman, supra note 13, at 334.
78. Id. at 337.
79. See text accompanying note 19 supra; see also, tex-t accompanying note 20 supra.
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be undertaken only in the case of deeply felt injustice. Waldman, for
example, suggests that under King's doctrine the members of the AFL-
CIO should refuse to obey all labor legislation believed to be unjust;
however, that doctrine says they should do so only if they feel strongly
enough about the injustice to go to jail for it-a far cry from a simple
attitude of "if I don't like it, I won't obey it."
The second inadequately discussed point, related to the first, is Wald-
man's central assumption that "you cannot build a fence around this kind
of program,"8 and thus disobedience by one group under certain circum-
stances is likely to lead to disobedience by other groups under different
circumstances. Admittedly, King leaves himself open to being accused
of advocating such a doctrine, for he does speak of the "moral responsi-
bility to disobey unjust laws."'" However, there are at least implied in
his articulation of the civil disobedient's position, two important limita-
tions on this disobedience. The first, as mentioned above, is the willing-
ness to accept punishment, and the second is the need for the injustice to
be genuinely and deeply felt. Although he does not directly state the
second limitation, it is suggested by his definition of an unjust law as
one which does not "square with the moral law or the law of God."8"
Thus, under this restrictive definition of an unjust law, one would not
have a right to resort to civil disobedience every time he came out on the
short end of a legislative or judicial decision; it would have to involve a
very fundamental value. Quite possibly disobedience even under these
conditions would lead to the general breakdown feared by Waldman, but
since he did not adequately take them into consideration in his article,
proof of his point remains incomplete.
The next point involves the highly disputed question of whether
legal means of redress exist for grievances.83 Waldman outlines the
great legal progress civil rights programs have made in the pastk---pro-
gress which is not denied by King-but he does not address himself to
the possibility that such legal means have reached a plateau, and further
progress requires the catalyst of civil disobedience. Nor does he discuss
the nature of an aggrieved person's duty, should it become obvious that
the democratic processes will not correct a deeply felt injustice.
Finally, his answer to King's position, that an unjust law is one
which is made binding on a minority who had no part in its making,
while not binding on the majority who made the law, seems to miss
80. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
81. See text accompanying note 19. mtpra.
82. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
83. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
84. See Waldman, supra note 13, at 331-32.
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King's point. He says there are thousands of laws which are binding on
minorities only, such as laws affecting only cities of a certain size, or
only certain professions," and that everyone under 21 is denied the right
to vote, yet they must obey the law. 6 However, these classifications
which meet the equal protection requirements of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and voting qualifications based on age or mental capacity, are not
comparable to a systematic exclusion from the political processes of a
group on the sole criteria of race, unless one is willing to maintain that
this racial classification is in some sense "reasonable"-in fact Waldman
emphatically denies any such bias.17 It is likely that King's argument is
susceptible of attack, perhaps on the basis that legal means exist to obtain
full participation in the legal processes, or even on the basis that if one
accepts the other benefits of society, he must obey the laws regardless of
his inability to take part in the making of the laws-but not on the theory
that age requirements for voting, or laws based on classifications per-
mitted under the fourteenth amendment, are comparable to a systematic
disenfranchisement of a racial minority.
John Rawls of Harvard University is less absolute in his disapproval
of civil disobedience; and in the article here examined, 88 he deals with the
duty of obedience to law as a general proposition, and gives no particular
consideration to the contemporary Civil Rights Movement. He states
that assuming the legal system is a constitutional democracy, "sometimes
we have an obligation to obey what we think, and think correctly, is an
unjust law.""0  Rawls bottoms this obligation upon the "duty of fair
play.""0 He explains this by saying that a society is a cooperative effort
which yields advantages because everyone, or nearly everyone, is willing
to restrict his own liberty by submitting to the will of the majority. How-
ever, any one person can obtain the benefits of the system even though
he refuses to restrict his own liberty, because as long as nearly all of the
others so cooperate the system will continue to yield its benefits, despite
his own non-cooperation. "Under these conditions a person who has ac-
cepted the benefits of the scheme is bound by a duty of fair play to do
his part and not take advantage of the free benefit Ly not cooperating.""9
The reason that a person has a duty to obey laws which he considers
unjust is based on the acceptance of two principles. The first principle
85. Id. at 332-33.
86. Id. at 332.
87. Id. at 331.
88. Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, ir LAW AND PHILosoPHY 3
(1964).
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id. at 9-10.
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is that a just procedure for law making creates social conditions which
are better than anarchy, and the second is that, of the limited number of
just procedures available, none can make the judgment of any single
individual as to what is just always decisive (and if it did, it would not
be "just"). Therefore every individual accepting the system must at
times acquiesce in what he thinks is unjust in order to preserve the pro-
cedure which he considers to be a generally just procedure.2
Rawls emphasizes that this rationale for obedience applies only to a
constitutional democracy, which presupposes that "there is a constitution
establishing a position of equal citizenship and securing freedom of the
person, freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, and such political
equality as in suffrage and the right to participate in the political pro-
cess." 93 This limitation of his justification for obedience to a constitu-
tional democracy raises the question of whether his rationale is applicable
to contemporary civil disobedience. To the extent that civil rights pro-
testors defy a law which is unjust because "it is inflicted on a minority
that, as a result of being denied the right to vote, had no part in enact-
ing or devising the law,"'94 Rawls' rationale seems inapplicable.
However, the matter cannot be so easily dismissed, for at this point
two ambiguities develop in considering this disobedience in light of
Rawls' reasoning. These ambiguities become more obvious when the
following language is considered:
. . . if the constitution is just, and if one has accepted the bene-
fits of its working and intends to continue doing so, and if the
rule enacted is within certain limits, then one has an obligation,
based on the principle of fair play, to obey it when it comes
one's turn.9"
The first ambiguity involves the definition of a "just constitution" in
relation to the American federal system. Assuming that the civil dis-
obedients consider the overall constitutional system as essentially fair,
can one single out a part of that system-e.g., the State of Alabama-to
disobey, while submitting to the rest? In other words, can a citizen con-
form to Rawls' standard by agreeing to submit to all laws enacted and
enforced by the federal government, even though he thinks some such
laws are unjust, because he accepts the federal governmnt as a just sys-
tem, while at the same time having no obligation to obey unjust laws of a
particular state, because it is not believed to be a just system? To push
92. Id. at 11-13.
93. Id. at 5.
94. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
95. See, Rawls, sucpra note 88, at 9
494
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the same idea further, could one be loyal to a state which has a just con-
stitution, while having no such obligation to obey the ordinances of a
particular county (or township), because a politically corrupt group has
control of the local governmental machinery?" Thus in a simplistic uni-
tary model of a legal system, it is much easier to judge whether it is of a
quality to deserve the citizen's obedience under a duty of fair play, but
when the unity system is replaced by a pluralistic, and to some extent
hierarchial, system, with several levels of government, of varying degrees
of justness, the problem of duty of obedience becomes much more compli-
cated. Of course the crucial factor in determining the possibility-from
both a theoretical and practical standpoint-of maintadning such a schizo-
phrenic allegiance is whether the federal and state (and perhaps local)
levels of government make up an integral and essentially inseparable legal
system, or whether these levels comprise two (or three) systems which
are at least to a large degree separate. If the latter alternative is correct,
then by Rawls' standard the civil rights advocates can defy the unjust
laws of an unjust state, while maintaining allegiance to the rest of the
American legal system; if the former presents the more realistic picture,
then selection of a certain aspect of the legal system for defiance is not
compatible with allegiance to the rest of the system.
The second ambiguity concerns the phrase "if one has accepted the
benefits of its working and intends to continue doing so." Apparently
Rawls is saying that this acceptance of the benefits of a legal system does
not in itself create an obligation to obey laws that one believes are unjust,
for such obligation exists only when there is this acceptance and the con-
stitution is just." Assuming one accepts the benefits of the legal system
-as the civil rights advocates apparently have-but reserves the right to
disobey laws he believes to be unjust because the constitution is not just,
the question then is whether such a person ought to expect others within
the system to obey laws they believe unjust. In other terms, can the civil
rights advocates disobey segregation laws which they believe to be un-
just, while expecting the segregationists to obey desegregation orders
which they believe to be unjust? If Rawls based his duty of obedience
strictly on the principle of fair play, the answer would seem to be "no,"
and under the condition of an unjust constitution, all a person would
96. This question is not necessarily a reductio ad absureium because a local en-
trenched political machine may be nearly impossible to eradicate, and thus a certain class,
may feel that, to use Rawls words, "a permanent majority, or majority coalition, has
deliberately set out to undercut its basis" at least on local matters, and unless the dis-
criminatory practices are gross enough to be unconstitutional, there may be "no chance
of successful constitutional resistance." Id. at 15.
97. See text accompanying note 95 supra.
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have a right to expect is that others will obey only laws which they do
not consider unjust.
However, Rawls implies that there are other standards of right and
wrong which transcend an obligation of obedience based on the reciprocal
duty of fair play, for in the same paragraph quoted above, he says "if
the rule enacted is within certain limits." Likewise at other places he
talks of certain crimes which involve "wrongs as such""8 and of "the
depth of the injustice of the law enacted."99  All of this suggests that
Rawls is ultimately relying on certain fundamental principles of justice to
which a law must conform in order to deserve a citizen's obedience, and
if one looks to these moral principles-the nature of which Rawls does
not clearly spell out'---to decide if he has a duty to obey a law, then one
could say he has a right to disobey laws he considers unjust while ex-
pecting others to obey laws they consider unjust. In other words, the
civil rights advocates could maintain, with at least no violence to consis-
tency, that they have no duty to obey segregation laws because these laws
violate certain fundamental principles, but that segregationists do have a
duty to obey orders they consider unjust, because by the standard ac-
cepted by the civil rights proponents, such orders are in reality not un-
just. Of course, all of this is assuming that the citizen does not believe
that the constitution is just, for if it is accepted as just, then Rawls'
principle of fair play compels both to obey all laws ("within certain
limits"), aside from any question of fundamental principles of justice.
This willingness by Rawls to look ultimately to transcendental
standards leads back to a question touched on earlier-does Martin
Luther King limit the right to disobey laws to only those laws inflicted
on a disenfranchised minority, that is, laws made under an unjust con-
stitution? While he is not altogether clear on this point, the answer is
apparently "no" because he speaks of the substantive requirement of a
law that it "squares with the moral law or the law of God." '' The im-
plication is that regardless of the justness of the legal system, if a law is
unjust, a citizen has a right to disobey it. At this point according to
Rawls such disobedience would be wrong because of the duty of fair
play. However, as suggested earlier, Rawls is willing to abandon this
principle if the law is not "within certain limits" and a person "simply
98. See, Rawls, supra note 88, at 4.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Rawls does talk of the "principles of a just constitution," which are, first,
"that everyone have an equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like
liberty for all," and secondly, that "inequalities are arbitrary unless it is reasonable to
expect that they will work out for everyone's advantages and . . . the . . . offices to
which they attach . . . are open to all." Id. at 11.
101. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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has to balance his obligation to oppose an unjust statute against his obli-
gation to abide by a just constitution."'' 2  Therefore, if the injustice is
believed to be very great, then one can disobey the law, and still, appar-
ently, expect others to tolerate what they consider unjustness for the sake
of the just constitution, until they also are faced with a great injustice.
As noted in the discussion of Waldman's position,' there is at least im-
plied in Martin Luther King's doctrine a restriction of the right of dis-
obedience to laws which are believed to be extremely unjust, and thus, if
he does so restrict this right, then there seems to be agreement between
King and Rawls as to the right of disobedience even under a just con-
stitution.
Sidney Hook, in Chapter Three of THE PARADOXES OF FREEDOM, 0 4
favors civil disobedience in a democratic society under limited circum-
stances, and if the protestor is willing to accept openly the punishment for
the violation.
Hook says that a democratic society is an attempt to "escape the di-
lemma between the acceptance of tyranny, on the one hand, and anarchy,
on the other."'' In a democracy major policies ot government depend
upon the consent of the governed. Tyranny is avoided because one who
disagrees with a law is free to try to convince the niajority of its unjust-
ness, and anarchy is avoided because once the vote is taken, the majority's
decision is accepted and the enacted law is obeyed by all, until it is re-
pealed by the same process.' It is the faith of the democrat that all
legitimate aims can eventually be reconciled or achieved through this
process, and thus "there is a presumption of validity in any law passed by
democratic process, in the sense that it commands a prima facie justified
obedience."'01 7
However, this faith can be strained in two ways. One way in
which it can be strained is by procedural violation, which means that the
democratic processes are so distorted that doubt arises as to whether the
processes still retain their democratic character.' Hook says that if
such a point is reached, the citizen is as free to oppcse the law as he is to
oppose an unjust law of any tyrannical government. ' As to the right to
resist the laws of a dictatorship, Hook states that 3t is "axiomatic" that
any person who truly believes in self-government cannot oppose, in prin-
102. See, Rawls, supra note 88, at 7.
103. See text accompanying note 82 supra.
104. HooK, THE PARADOXES OF FREEDoM 106 (1962).
105. Id. at 112.
106. Id. at 112-13.
107. Id. at 113.
108. Id. at 114.
109. Id. at 118.
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ciple, revolutionary resistance to such government, although for practical'
reasons he may forego such resistance."' Therefore, if civil rights ad-
vocates are limiting civil disobedience to laws "inflicted on a minority
that . . . had no part in enacting or devising the law,""' then Hook
would agree that at least in principle they have the right to disobey these
laws because they are acts of despotism, and not of the democratic pro-
cess. However, Hook implies (but he is not altogether clear) that this
rejection must be based on a failure of the entire legal system, and not
merely on a few isolated instances of undemocratic action. He states:
"But so long as one still regards the community, despite its procedural
lapses, as still functioning under a democratic political system, revolu-
tionary opposition to it cannot be justified on democratic grounds.""' 2
Thus, apparently as long as the civil rights leaders accept the legal system
as essentially democratic, they are not free to disobey, under the same jus-
tification that tyranny may be resisted, particular laws which have not
met the procedural requirements of a democracy." 3
However, as mentioned previously," 4 King does not limit the right
of disobedience to laws which fall to meet the procedural standards of the
democratic process, and extends it to laws which are substantively unjust,
regardless of the mode of their enactment. This point is similar to the
second way in which Hook says the faith of a democrat can be strained,
that is, by "extremely unwise or oppressive substantive action'""--enact-
ments which are so morally iniquitous that regardless of observance of
procedural forms some citizens may feel compelled to disobey them."
0
Hook states that one possible justification for disobedience of these
procedurally correct, but substantively immoral laws, is to reject the dem-
ocratic ideal of self-government, and frankly admit you are appealing to
a higher law or principle which you value more than the democratic
ideal."' However, asks Hook, how can a democrat, i.e., one who remains
faithful to the principle of the democratic compromise, ever defend dis-
obedience of constitutionally enacted laws? He answers that he can de-
fend such disobedience "only if he willingly accepts the punishment en-
tailed by his defiance of the law, only if he does not seek to escape or
110. Id. at 109-10.
111. 'See text accompanying note 19 supra.
112. See, Rawls, supra note 88, at 118-19
113. For the possibility of having an undemocratic subdivision within a larger,
generally democratic, legal system, and the possible complicated problems it may create
in relation to the duty of obedience, see text between notes 95-97 .rupra.
114. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
115. Hoox, op. cit. supra note 104, at 113.
116. Id. at 113-14.
117. Id. at 117-18.
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subvert or physically resist it."'lS This willingness to accept the punish-
ment is a necessary condition to such justification because it can serve as
a "moral challenge and educational reinfluence on the attitudes of the
majority," and can arouse in the majority second thoughts as to the
law's justness and wisdom."' This language is of course very similar
to that used by Martin Luther King, and in fact, Hook cites the civil
rights sit-in and sit-down strikes as an example of such proper civil dis-
obedience within a democratic community.'
However, Hook does caution that "civil disobedience is at best a
danger to a democracy," 12' and from the standpoint of the democratic
ideal can only be justified so long as it does not begin to rend apart the
social fabric, or endanger the democratic process itself. 22 In other words,
all civil disobedients in a democratic society, including civil rights advo-
cates, must constantly be alert to this danger, and be prepared to cease the
disobedience when this danger becomes imminent.
Morris Keeton, in an article entitled The Morality of Civil Disobedi-
ence,' 3 takes the position that civil disobedience under the proper condi-
tions is not merely a danger to be tolerated as the lesser of evils, but can
be a positive force for good. "We should enlarge the role of civil dis-
obedience and enhance its effectiveness for constructive change.' 24
Keeton defines civil disobedience as "an act of deliberate and open
violation of law with the intent, within the framework of the prevailing
form of government, to protest a wrong or to accomplish some better-
ment in the society.' 22  He distinguishes civil disobedience from eva-
sion of the law where the violator attempts to conceal his violation; from
civil rebellion whose purpose is overthrow of the government by non-
constitutional means; from permitted exceptions to a law, such as con-
scientious objection to military service; from pranks which violate the
law, but which do not have the moral intent which is part of civil dis-
obedience, and finally, from acts which inadvertently violate a law be-
cause of the actor's ignorance.'
Keeton believes that contemporary civil rights p rotests fit within his
definition of civil disobedience,'27 and a review of the characteristics of
118. Id. at 117. (Emphasis Hook's.)
119. Id. at 119.
120. Id. at 124.
121. Id. at 124.
122. Id. at 120, 124-25.
123. 43 TEXAs L. REv. 507 (1965).
124. Id. at 507.
125. Id. at 508.
126. Id. at 508-11.
127. Id. at 510, 516-21.
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this movement, as discussed earlier,128 indicates that this is a correct con-
clusion. Martin Luther King states that the violation must be open,'29
and as pointed out, the Movement seeks the improvement, not overthrow,
of the present legal system.'
After thus defining civil disobedience, Keeton says that civil dis-
obedience is right and good only if certain conditions exist, and he pro-
ceeds to give guidelines, in the form of questions, to determine if such
conditions are present. 1 '
The first guideline asks if the protestors are willing to allow their
opponents to use the same tactics to promote their own cause. Looking
at one's own actions as if performed by an opponent will give the would-
be civil disobedient a more objective view of its probable consequences." 2
Martin Luther King does not say directly that he would allow the segre-
gationists to use the same tactics to oppose civil rights laws, but he does
contrast breaking a law "openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept
the penalty" with the segregationist's "evading or defying the law."' 8
However, the difficulty with this test is that if a civil disobedient takes
the position that there are certain absolute values which should not be
violated-as King's language about a law "squar[ing] with the moral
law or law of God"'34 implies-and not the relativistic position that all
beliefs have equal right to actualization, then the test is inappropriate.
This is true because such civil disobedient is saying that if, and only if,
laws violate these basic values may they be disobeyed. This need for the
civil disobedience to be directed against an evil law is a fundamental con-
dition to its rightness, and thus one cannot test its rightness by asking if
a person may also use it as a tactic to promote an evil (as viewed by the
civil disobedient who is testing his own actions). It is analogous to
saying that in determining whether a certain degree of violence is justi-
fiable in physical self-defense, one must ask: "Would I permit another
person to employ such measures in an aggressive attack?" In other
words, this test ignores the possibility that a civil disobedient may believe
that the moral rightness of his cause is the only reason such action is jus-
tified, and if he must ask himself whether his opponent (who by his
definition is morally wrong) should be allowed to employ the same tac-
tic, his answer will inevitably be "no." If the test simply means that one
128. See text accompanying notes 5-20 mipra.
129. See text accompanying notes 19, 20 supra. Keeton cites the same statement by
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should attempt to be objective about the consequences. of his action, then it
seems that it should be put in terms of whether another person in a simi-
lar moral position, but on a different issue, should be allowed to so act.
To put it in terms of an opponent's right to do so, results in a test which
does not consider one of the relevant circumstances, that is, the violation
of a moral right.
The second guideline question asks if the civil disobedients have no-
tified the authorities of their intended disobedience, to assure the open-
ness of their violation, and to allow the police to maintain order. How-
ever, this duty to inform the authorities exists only so long as the police
do not attempt to use this notice to frustrate the ntended acts of dis-
obedience."' Contemporary civil disobedients have generally met this
criteria, for most of their demonstrations have been announced in ad-
vance, 130 and King unequivocally advocates open violation.
Thirdly, is the violation aimed at a specific grievance which is clearly
identified by the protestors and communicated to the rest of society?
This pinpointing of the protested wrong is important both for the deci-
sion to protest, and for the effectiveness of the protest in arousing the
sentiment of others in favor of the protestor's position." 7 While this
standard seems to be met when the law protested against is "unjust in
itself," this conclusion is much more doubtful when the disobeyed law is
not considered unjust in itself, but is disobeyed to convey dissatisfaction
with other more general conditions."' As Martin Luther King says,
even where the injustice of a particular law is hard to see, it is often
necessary to disobey it "to call attention to overall injustice. '
However, Keeton further states that this need for clarity of goals
and communication is not an absolute, for "[S]ometimes the victims of
injustice are not able to articulate the grievance that is nevertheless great
and real."' 40  Thus even disobedience of otherwise just laws by civil
rights advocates to draw attention to general injustices meet with Kee-
ton's approval, under certain unspecified situations. However, this po-
sition raises several questions which Keeton does not discuss. The first
is, if the purpose of civil disobedience is correction of injutice, and if
those who are protesting the injustice (and thus should be more keenly
aware of its existence) cannot articulate the injustice, how can the rest
of the population be expected to recognize the condition causing the in-
135. See note 123 supra, at 515.
136. See KING, op. it. supra note 1, passim.
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justice in order to correct it? Secondly, since the purpose of civil dis-
obedience is to "work within the framework of the legal system to rec-
tify specific wrongs,"' does not a general protest, which does not clearly
distinguish the "unjust laws" from the rest of the legal system, amount
to a condemnation, at least by implication, of the whole legal system? In
other words, if the general legal system is accepted as good, then a protest
aimed at a specific unjust law is saying in effect that this particular law
is not typical-it is an anomaly in the legal system-and thus the protest's
negative effect on the rest of the legal system is reduced by the sharp
separation; whereas if this distinction is not constantly and sharply main-
tained, then are not the good laws brought into disrepute along with the
bad? The third question is, if civil disobedience is based on "felt" in-
justices, and not on specific and defined grievances, does this not make
much more difficult the restriction of the disobedience to narrow bounds,
than if it is centered on a specific wrong? For example, if a certain re-
ligious minority disagrees with a law, e.g., compulsory school attendance,
then to refuse to obey this law is a relatively restricted act whose limits
are fairly easily determined, that is, the refusal to send the children to
school. But if the minority just feels in general "persecuted," then the
limits of action are not obvious, and almost anything and everything
which causes a disturbance can be fair game as a means of drawing at-
tention to the fact that the minority is dissatisfied.
The fourth guideline asks if the means of protest are "relevant to,
and among the more effective ways of securing, the specific end being
sought ?""', This is a factual question which must be asked of each act
of disobedience; to use Keeton's example, does a sit-in at a chain store in
New York have any effect on discrimination practiced by the same chain
in New Orleans? It may or may not, depending on the relationship
among the individual units in the chain.'43
Fifth, can the civil disobedients prevent violence on their own part,
and are they taking care to keep violence by their opponents to a mini-
mum? "' Keeton cites the civil rights groups, specifically SNCC, SCLC,
and CORE, as examples of protestors who make every effort to fulfill
this criterion.'45 At the same time he condemns recent riots in the North
as violating this rule and the rule requiring centering on a specific
wrong,'46 and of course such riots are likewise strongly condemned by
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the above cited "middle group" of civil rights organizations. 4 7
The sixth guideline asks if the disobedients are sincerely protesting
for the reasons given for the protest, or is the protest really to gain some
other, unstated, objective? Keeton suggests that the willingness to suf-
fer the legal consequences of the violation is a minimum test of this
sincerity.14
The next test inquires if other less hazardous means to remove the
wrong have been employed without success.'49 Thi3 is very close to the
important question discussed earlier,' that is, whether or not a legal
means for redress exists, and as stated then, this is a central point of dis-
agreement. Keeton maintains that civil disobedience need not always be
a last resort, 1 and thus he seems to agree with the position of those civil
rights advocates who concede that legal redress is possible, but contend
that such correction will be too slow.
1 5 2
The final test asks if the civil disobedients have used reasonable care
to foresee and to evaluate the consequences of their action."3 Keeton
emphasizes that this is not the same standard as that of the philosophers
who look upon civil disobedience as a measure to be employed only to
correct grave injustices. He says that this is a different test: "not the
magnitude of the benefit sought, but the net worth of the anticipated
benefit over its probable costs."'5 4 Thus in a society that distinguishes
civil disobedience from other kinds of violations, "it may be morally per-
missible to incur a small penalty deliberately in order to meet a minor
emergency or to correct a minor grievance.""' 5 Of course under this
permissive standard the actions of contemporary civil disobedients are
more apt to be approved than under the "grave wrongs" test. However,
Keeton does not discuss an important possible implication of his "net
worth" test, and that is, he does not give due consideration to the pos-
sibility that adherence to law is a positive value in itself, aside from the
utility to be gained from each act of obedience. While the "grave
wrongs" test at least suggests that obedience to law is the normal, ex-
pected conduct, the "net worth" test implies that the existence of law is
only one of many factors to be weighed in determining how one is to
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conduct himself externally, and thus law is not given a position of pri-
macy as a behavior determinant. Perhaps this implication need not re-
sult from his test, or perhaps Keeton would maintain that indeed law
should not be given a position of primacy, but in any case the possibility
should have been more fully considered.
Central Points of Disagreement.
Much of the disagreement among the seven writers seems to center
around two issues which are formulated in various ways in their writ-
ings. One issue involves the "rightness" of civil disobedience, in the
sense of whether a citizen "owes" obedience to society as a price he must
pay for the benefits he receives from it. Plato has Socrates raise this
question when he quotes the laws as asking "Was that our agreement?
Or was it that you would submit to whatever judgments the state should
pronounce?"' 1 Rawls calls it the "duty of fair play" ;"'7 it is Locke's
"social contract,"' 58 and Hook's "democratic process" whereby everyone
is free to agitate for his position, but once the vote is taken all must sub-
mit to the decision." 9 It is basically the principle of exchange, or quid
pro quo; in terms applicable to any government, it is obedience given in
exchange for benefits accepted; in democratic terminology, it is the
agreement to submit to every majority decision even when a particular
decision is disapproved, in exchange for like submission by others even
when they disagree with a decision. Putting this concept in terms of the
question of contemporary civil disobedience, those writers who tend to
disapprove of civil disobedience would stress the logic of the position that
civil rights proponents cannot expect their opponents to submit to civil
rights laws which the latter consider unjust, if the civil rights proponents
themselves refuse to obey the law when the decision goes against them.
On the other hand, those favoring civil disobedience would emphasize
that in accepting punishment for the disobedience, the disobedients make
a sacrifice, admittedly of a different sort, in exchange for the expected
obedience of the rest of the society, and thus do not get a "free ride" in
society. Of course this does not obviate the point that others in society
submit to law in expectation of receiving like obedience from the protes-
tors, and not in exchange for the protestors' willingness to accept pun-
ishment for disobedience.
At least one of the philosophers, Thomas Aquinas, avoids the logi-
cal inconsistency by positing an objective natural law which gives to all
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persons a common standard to determine if a law is just.16 The exis-
tence of this standard means there are "right" and "wrong" ideas of
what is just, and if a person "correctly" believes that a law is unjust, he
does not have the same duty to obey that law as has another person to
obey a law which the latter "incorrectly" views as unjust. Thus, if one
maintains that this objective standard exists, the agreement among men
may be to submit to only laws that are not unjust, and at least theoreti-
cally, all men can perceive which laws are unjust. This same concept of
objectivity of moral standards is implied in Rawls' position when he
abandons "the duty of fair play" as controlling once one gets beyond
"certain limits,"'' which suggests that these limits are ascertainable by all.
The second issue focuses on the consequences of disobedience, and
asks, even assuming disobedience is "justified" in this instance, if such
disobedience will cause all law to fall into disrepute, and thus promote
disorder which is more onerous than the original grievance. Aquinas
speaks of yielding the right to "avoid scandal or disturbance" or "inflict-
ing a more grievous hurt,"'6 2 and Waldman fears "you cannot build a
fence around this kind of program."' 6 ' Unlike the first issue, this ques-
tion is to a large extent a "factual" one of whether disobedience of some
laws, under certain circumstances, will create disrespect for all law. As in
the first issue, emphasis differs according to the writer's attitude toward
civil disobedience (or perhaps the attitude differs according to the em-
phasis)-those unfavorable tend to concentrate on the fact that there are
a great many different ideas of what is just, and thus most laws could
be disobeyed by some segment of the population; those approving dis-
obedience stress the conditions which they would place on disobedience,
such as willingness to accept punishment and the limitation of disobedi-
ence to deeply felt injustices.
Obviously these two central issues are closely related to each other,
and are not completely separable. The duty owed Ly a citizen to his fel-
low citizens may not simply be that of permitting the fulfillment of the
purpose of each particular law, but may also include the obligation to pro-
mote respect for the legal system by obeying all law. Conversely, the
society's view of the "right" of a citizen to disobey a law he believes to
be unjust, may affect the chance that such disobedience will create general
disrespect for law.
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